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CONTENTS.

	PAGE
EDITORIALS	125—128
The Disgrace of the Nation — Cuba and the Senate — The Universal Postal Congress — Our Un-American Anglomania.	
EDITORIAL NOTES	129—131
Press Citations — Sherman's Notification to England — J. W. Foster's Mission — McKinley Cuban Policy — De- plorable State of Cuba — United States and Spain — Ex- Senator Edmunds on Morgan Resolution — Fight in Spanish Lobbies — Washington Committee's Appeal — Lisbon Peace Commission — Greece and Turkey — Death of Dr. Wirth — French Naval Scheme.	
Annual Meeting of the American Peace Society	132
Annual Report of Directors of the American Peace Society	133
Opinions on Defeat of Arbitration Treaty	136—140
The Independent — The Outlook — The Congregationalist — The Advance — Zion's Herald — The Christian Register — The Nation — The Evangelist — The Christian Intelligencer — Harper's Weekly — City and State — Boston Herald — Philadelphia Press — Baltimore News — Inter-Ocean.	
Eternal Peace, <i>Immanuel Kant</i>	141

THE DISGRACE OF THE NATION.

The Arbitration Treaty was rejected by the Senate on the 5th of May, and the nation thereby self-humiliated and disgraced before the world. But it is useless to rail about what cannot for the time being be changed. One is justified, however, in following the example of Michael, the archangel, in his dispute with the Devil about the body of Moses, and in saying, The Lord rebuke thee, O Senate!

It is in nowise easy to make a clear statement of the causes which brought about the defeat of the treaty. This might be done, if one could have turned some psychical kinetoscope upon the minds of the Senators during the long four months while the document was undergoing their interminable "punching"; but for want of pictures of their mental movements no complete statement of reasons can be given.

The vote shows that the silver question furnished the chief ground of opposition. This reason was not put prominently forward, but it silently did its work. Of the thirty Senators whose votes are recorded against the treaty, including four who were paired, twenty-five, or five-sixths of them, were silver men. Some of these made no speeches. No remarks of theirs are anywhere recorded. But their votes weighed just as heavy as those of the eternal talker and the speech-making hair-splitters.

The silver dislike of Great Britain was only one phase of the general dislike and distrust of that country, which was the ostensible reason for the rejection of the treaty. The untrustworthiness of Great Britain, the trickiness of her diplomacy, the aggressiveness of her colonial policy, were incessantly worked in the Senate for all there was in them. She had sought this treaty that she might tie our hands and then do as she pleased. This position of the leading Senators who opposed the agreement would be infinitely funny if it were not so pitifully stupid. The Olney-Pauncefote treaty was of our own seeking much more than of Great Britain's. None of these Senators seemed to have the faintest notion that the movement in England for arbitration came, not from the Government except by necessity after long ignoring of the subject, but from the masses of the people, the sincere friends of peace and good understanding, most of whom are as much ashamed of English diplomacy, in its selfish and unfeeling aspects, as we in America are astonished and indignant at it. The impossibility of Great Britain's tying our hands by the treaty and keeping her own perfectly free seems never to have occurred to these sage Senatorial heads. Their trembling eyes were on the British scare-crow which their own imaginations had set up, and they could see nothing else.

Another reason that operated, though somewhat in the dark, was dislike of Mr. Cleveland and Mr. Olney. But this reason seems to have influenced a number of the Senators who were really in favor of such a convention as much as it did its open enemies. In no other way can we fully account for the intense dislike of the treaty in its original form and the eagerness with which it was cut

up and patched up until it was an entirely different document, a real Salisbury document, having no Olney marks upon it. Whether consciously or not, these amenders did almost as much to kill the convention as its open opponents. They created at the very start a dislike and distrust of it which all their eloquence and skill and sincere interest, in the later stages of the discussion, could not remove.

We do not pretend to say that the fifty Senators who voted or paired for the treaty were not sincere friends of arbitration, but, with some exceptions, they seemed so over-sensitive about "American interests" that they were nearly blind to the importance of having a treaty of substantial and enduring worth, such as America's principles and practices called for. Thus a suspicious and only partially conscious Chauvinism on the part of many Senators otherwise friendly to the convention must be set down as one of the causes of the treaty's defeat, to say nothing of the rank jingoism of the chief of its opponents. At the last moment, after the Senate had spent sixteen weeks in transforming the document into something after its own heart, the discovery was made that some parts of it were in direct contradiction of other parts, and thus a new reason for its rejection was discovered by these critical minds.

How much Irish hatred of Great Britain had to do with the rejection, it is impossible to say. It is certain that this sentiment did a good deal of lobbying against ratification, and that it lobbied up to the very last moment.

Humiliated and disgraced as we feel over this ignominious outcome of what promised to be the greatest and most beneficent occurrence of the century, there is comfort and great encouragement in one fact; the cause of arbitration, and of permanent Anglo-American arbitration in particular, has received an enthusiastic and overwhelming ratification by the people of the country. All the work of the past is not lost. Nothing indeed is lost, but much gained. The cause is stronger in the United States than ever before. The people know its meaning better. The Senate may yield only slowly to the demands of public sentiment on the subject, but it will have to yield at last. The people will teach it that the highest interests and the true honor of the country are to be held above selfish love of prerogative and slavish attachment to Senatorial traditionalism. The loss of the arbitration treaty is something greatly to be deplored, but much more deplorable is the fact that the highest and most honored legislative body in the nation has proved itself incapable of comprehending and rising to the height of a great opportunity such as comes to men only once in a generation, and to some men never but once. It will not be long before the Senate will have the privilege of facing another treaty, perhaps next time with three or four nations parties to it. It is to be hoped that President

McKinley and Secretary Sherman will take the matter up again immediately. The people will not only uphold them in doing so, but will not be satisfied unless they do.

CUBA AND THE SENATE.

It becomes increasingly evident that the disease with which the United States Senate is afflicted is jingoism almost pure and simple. The malady is called love of liberty and humanity, germs of which are mixed up with it, but the ailment cannot be wrongly diagnosed after its recent violent exhibition of symptoms. The Morgan resolution recognizing the belligerency of the Cubans, after a long-continued and finally exciting debate, was forced into precedence over everything else in the Senate, and was passed on the 20th of May by a vote of 41 to 14. The resolution, which is a joint one, is thus worded:

Resolved, That a condition of public war exists between the government of Spain and the government proclaimed and for some time maintained by force of arms by the people of Cuba, and that the United States of America shall maintain a strict neutrality between the contending parties, according to each and all the rights of belligerents in the ports and territories of the United States.

An effort was made to get the resolution referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs where it might be examined in the light of the actual condition of affairs in Cuba, of which President McKinley hopes to get more accurate knowledge on the return of Mr. Calhoun whom he has sent as a special commissioner to make investigation. But reference to the Committee was voted down, and the opponents of the resolution were obliged to allow it to come to a vote or have important legislation demanding immediate attention indefinitely obstructed.

The utterly useless sentimentalism of the whole proceeding is the more apparent, because it is practically certain that the House will do nothing with the resolution. Mr. Reed is known to be in entire sympathy with the President in the matter, and without his consent the resolution, which cannot be gotten before the House without a special rule, will never be heard of in that body.

The unreasonableness of the Senate's action is also apparent from another standpoint. The President is known to be maturing a plan as rapidly as possible by which he hopes to bring about in a peaceful way a cessation of hostilities in Cuba and the independence of the island. He was opposed to the Senate resolution because of the greater difficulty which its adoption would put in his way in his negotiations with Spain. About the only conceivable effect of the passing of the resolution, aside from the extreme self-satisfaction which it must give to the Senators' souls, will be the possible strengthening of the Spanish government in its determination to prosecute hostilities against the Cubans to the bitter end, and